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1 Introduction
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a widely used approach to evaluate the efficiency of Deci-
sion Making Units (DMUs). In particular, DEA evaluates a DMU’s efficiency by comparing its
input and output quantities to those of other DMUs operating in a similar technological envi-
ronment.1 An attractive feature of DEA is that it is intrinsically nonparametric: DEA efficiency
evaluations need not assume a specific functional/parametric form for the production technology.
Instead, the production possibility set is reconstructed on the basis of the observed input-output
combinations, using standard production axioms. A DMU’s efficiency is then measured as the
distance from its input-output combination to the frontier of this production possibility set.
Traditional DEA methods typically treat DMUs’ production processes as a black box: they
only use information on the aggregate amounts of inputs and outputs, and not on how the
inputs and outputs are exactly linked to each other. Nevertheless, information on the allocation
of inputs to outputs is often available in empirical research settings. Including this information
can substantially increase the discriminatory power of the efficiency analysis, i.e. it creates
considerably more potential to identify inefficient production behavior. Cherchye et al (2013)
have put this idea into practice by developing a novel DEA-based methodology for measuring the
efficiency of DMUs characterized by multiple inputs and outputs. Their methodology accounts
for joint inputs in the production process, and explicitly includes information on how inputs are
allocated to outputs.2
The current paper takes this multi-output methodology one step further. We propose an
extension that quantifies possible efficiency gains by reallocating inputs over outputs. We capture
these efficiency gains by a new measure of coordination efficiency. The measure takes a value
of one when the input allocation over outputs is efficient, while a value below unity reveals
that the productive efficiency can further increase by reallocating the inputs more optimally.
Interestingly, our method also provides concrete guidelines on how to achieve the better input
allocation, which is especially attractive from a practical point of view.
We also show the empirical usefulness of our methodology through an application that evalu-
1See, for example, Fa¨re et al (1994), Cooper et al (2007), Fried et al (2008) and Cook and Seiford (2009) for
extensive reviews of DEA.
2The treatment of multi-output production is partly inspired on recent work regarding the modeling of multi-
person household consumption. See Cherchye et al (2007, 2011a,b).
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ates the efficiency of US universities. We believe that university performance forms an interesting
application area because universities typically have a two-fold assignment, i.e. education and re-
search. In our application, we consider a university as a DMU that consists of an education
division and a research division. Given our specific methodological contribution, a primal focus
will be on the (efficient) allocation of university budgets over education and research outputs.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates our research question
in more detail and relates it to the relevant literature. Section 3 formally introduces our measure
of coordination efficiency. As we will explain, this measure essentially captures the difference
between so-called centralized and decentralized efficiency. Section 4 discusses the practical im-
plementation of our theoretical efficiency measures. Section 5 shows that our distinction between
centralized and decentralized efficiency also bears an interesting dual representation. Section 6
presents our empirical application to US universities. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Multi-output production and input allocation
To set the stage, we first provide a verbal explanation of the ideas that we formalize in the
following sections. Next, we also discuss the relationship between our approach and alternative
approaches that have appeared in the DEA literature.
2.1 Centralized, decentralized and coordination efficiency
Multi-output production is often motivated by the presence of economies of scope, which origi-
nate from joint use of inputs (Cherchye et al (2008)). Economies of scope occur if the average
production cost decreases when the number of outputs increases (Baumol et al (1982)). Scope
economies typically originate from jointly (or “publicly”) used inputs, i.e. inputs that simulta-
neously benefit the production of multiple outputs. The DEA-based method of Cherchye et al
(2013) accounts for economies of scope by explicitly modeling the presence of joint inputs in the
production process.
We assume that a DMU consists of several divisions, where each division is responsible for the
production of one or more outputs. On the input side, we distinguish joint inputs from division-
specific inputs. Division-specific inputs differ from joint inputs in that they can be allocated
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to the outputs produced by a particular division.3 As we will formalize in the next section, we
assume that each division is characterized by its own production technology, while accounting
for interdependencies between the different technologies through joint inputs.
As mentioned before, we are particularly interested in the way that a DMU allocates the
available inputs among the divisions. More precisely, we consider whether a reallocation of the
division-specific inputs within a DMU can lead to efficiency gains. To examine these gains from
reallocation, we distinguish between centralized and decentralized efficiency measurement.
Essentially, the measure proposed by Cherchye et al (2013) considers efficiency from a de-
centralized perspective. In particular, the allocation of the division-specific inputs is considered
to be predetermined and taken for granted in the efficiency analysis. Therefore, we will refer to
Cherchye et al’s original measure as decentralized efficiency in the sequel.
Our following analysis will complement this measure of decentralized efficiency with an alter-
native (novel) measure of centralized efficiency. Intuitively, this measure assumes that a DMU’s
central management can reallocate inputs over output divisions. Clearly, such reallocation can
give rise to new gains of productive efficiency. We quantify these additional efficiency gains
by our measure of coordination efficiency, which we calculate as the ratio of centralized over
decentralized efficiency.
In Sections 3 and 4, we will introduce our measures of centralized and decentralized efficiency
as measures of input technical efficiency. Interestingly, our distinction between centralized and
decentralized efficiency also has an intuitive dual interpretation in terms of cost efficiency. In
dual terms, the distinction relates to the (shadow) input prices that are used to evaluate a DMU’s
cost efficiency, which are defined differently in the decentralized and centralized cases. This will
be explained more in detail in Section 5.
3Cherchye et al (2013) assume that a DMU is organized in such a way that each division is responsible for just
one output. In that case, the notion output-specific input is used, to be distinguished from joint input. However,
perfect information about the allocation of inputs to each individual output is often not available. We therefore
consider a division structure in this paper. A main advantage of such a division structure is that it suffices to
have data on the amount of inputs each division uses for the production of its outputs. Cherchye et al (2014)
adopted a similar division structure in a setting that is formally close to the one that we consider here.
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2.2 Related literature
At this point, it is worth indicating that there is a close link between the approach that we develop
here and other approaches that have been presented in the DEA literature. Most notably, our
set-up bears direct connections to earlier work on network DEA and centralized DEA models. In
a sense, our method is situated on the intersection of these two existing approaches, by combining
elements that are specific to each of them.
Firstly, there is clear relation with network DEA. Network models also add additional struc-
ture to the transformation process from inputs to outputs in the DEA assessment (see Fa¨re and
Grosskopf (2000), Fa¨re et al (2007) and Cook and Zhu (2014)). Moreover, network DEA can be
used to analyze the allocation of resources across various uses. For example, Fa¨re et al (1997)
consider the use of land to produce corn, wheat and soybeans.
Our approach has in common with network DEA that it explicitly incorporates information
about the allocation of inputs to specific outputs. However, a crucial difference pertains to our
dealing with joint inputs in the production model, which is not considered in the existing network
DEA models. As indicated above, by including joint inputs in the analysis, we effectively model
the presence of economies of scope, which forms a prime economic motivation for simultaneously
producing multiple outputs.
Secondly, Lozano and Villa (2004) introduced so-called centralized DEA models. These mod-
els assume that there is a centralized decision maker who “owns” or supervises the DMUs. The
centralized decision maker is interested in maximizing the efficiency of each individual unit, but
is also concerned about the total input consumption. Lozano and Villa (2004) assume that inputs
can be reallocated across DMUs and seek for an optimal allocation of the inputs among DMUs.
Following Lozano and Villa (2004), we also use the term “centralized” efficiency for a setting
where input reallocation is possible. However, a main distinguishing feature of our approach is
that we allocate inputs among various uses within the same DMU, i.e. across alternative pro-
duction technologies (associated with different output divisions). This contrasts with centralized
DEA models, which reallocate inputs across DMUs that are characterized by identical production
technologies.
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3 Theoretical efficiency measures
After introducing some necessary notation and terminology, we will formally define our measures
of centralized, decentralized and coordination efficiency. To structure our discussion, we will first
consider a theoretical set-up in which the production technology is known. The next section will
consider the practical implementation of our theoretical efficiency measures.
3.1 Preliminaries
Efficiency analysis starts from a data set with T observed DMUs that produce N outputs. We
assume that each DMU is subdivided into M divisions, where each division m (1 ≤ m ≤ M)
produces one or more outputs. Let dm represent the number of outputs produced by division
m. Thus, we have N = d1 + . . . + dM . For each DMU t (1 ≤ t ≤ T ), we observe the vector of
produced outputs yt ∈ RN+ , where
yt = (y
1
t , . . . ,y
M
t ), (1)
so that ymt ∈ Rd
m
+ denotes the vector of outputs produced by division m. Similarly, we also
observe the division-specific and joint inputs. For any output division m, the vector qmt ∈ RNspec+
contains the division-specific inputs. We let qt =
∑M
m=1 q
m
t , i.e. qt represents the total division-
specific inputs of DMU t. Finally, Qt ∈ RNjoin+ represents the joint inputs of DMU t. We note
that these joint inputs Qt cannot be allocated to particular divisions; they are simultaneously
used in the production process of all output divisions. Taken together, the empirical analysis
starts from the following data set:
S = {(yt,q1t , . . . ,qMt ,Qt) | t = 1, . . . , T}. (2)
Next, we consider a separate production technology for each output division. Importantly,
we account for interdependencies between the different technologies through jointly used inputs.
More formally, we characterize the production technology of a division m by input requirement
sets Im(ym), which contain all combinations of division-specific and joint inputs (qm,Q) that
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can produce the output quantities ym, i.e.
Im(ym) = {(qm,Q) ∈ RNspec+ × RNjoin+ |(qm,Q) can produce ym}. (3)
Finally, as explained above, our centralized efficiency measure assumes that the central man-
agement of a DMU coordinates the production process of all divisions. More specifically, the
central management determines how much of the total amount q of division-specific inputs goes
to every division. To formalize this idea, we need to consider input requirement sets I(y) for the
“aggregate” output vector y (defined over all divisions simultaneously). These input requirement
sets are constructed from the division-specific sets Im(ym), as follows:
I(y) = {(q,Q) | ∃ q1, . . . ,qM such that
M∑
m=1
qm = q and ∀m : (qm,Q) ∈ Im(ym)}. (4)
Thus, each set I(y) contains all combinations of division-specific and joint inputs (q,Q) that can
produce the output y = (y1, . . . ,yM ). In particular, we say that (q,Q) can produce y if the
input q can be allocated among the divisions such that every division can produce the associated
output ym.
3.2 Efficiency measures
Throughout, we will consider input-oriented efficiency measurement, which identifies the maxi-
mum possible input reduction while keeping the output fixed. In doing so, we adopt radial (or
Debreu-Farrell) efficiency measures, which are most popular in applied DEA work. Essentially,
for some evaluated DMU and a given technology (represented by input requirement sets), these
radial measures seek the maximum equiproportionate input reduction for the given output. At-
tractively, the measures have a natural degree interpretation: they are situated between 0 and
1, with an efficiency score of unity indicating technically efficient production, while lower values
reflect greater productive inefficiency. Finally, and importantly, radial measures also have an
interesting dual representation in terms of cost efficiency, which we will illustrate in Section 5.
Let us first introduce our radial measure of decentralized efficiency TEdt , which -to recall- is
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the one that was originally proposed by Cherchye et al (2013). In formal terms, we have
TEdt = min{θ | ∀m : (θqmt , θQt) ∈ Im(ymt )}. (5)
This measure captures the maximum equiproportionate reduction of the inputs (captured by θ)
that is feasible, for the given (observed) allocation of division-specific inputs.
By contrast, our (novel) centralized efficiency measure TEct no longer takes the observed
input allocation for granted. It quantifies the maximum input reduction that is feasible while
accounting for possible (optimal) reallocation of the division-specific inputs. We define
TEct = min{θ | (θqt, θQt) ∈ I(yt)}. (6)
Basically, the measure considers not only the production process of the individual divisions (like
the measure TEdt ) but also the coordination among divisions. In other words, in contrast to
our measure of decentralized efficiency, our centralized efficiency measure takes into account the
inefficiencies that result from a suboptimal allocation of the inputs to the output divisions.
This directly provides the basic intuition of our following result, which states that decentral-
ized efficiency is never lower than centralized efficiency.4
Proposition 1. We have that TEc ≤ TEd.
In turn, this motivates the following ratio measure CoEt as a natural measure for the efficiency
of input coordination among divisions:
CoEt =
TEct
TEdt
. (7)
By construction, this coordination efficiency measure is situated between 0 and 1. A coordination
efficiency value of unity indicates that the inputs are allocated in an optimal way across the
divisions. By contrast, a lower efficiency value reveals that DMU t’s productive efficiency can
be further increased by input reallocation. More specifically, for the given output DMU t can
achieve additional input reduction by adjusting the input mix over output divisions.
4The proofs of our results appear in Appendix B.
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As a final note, we can also write
TEct = C
oEt × TEdt , (8)
which provides an intuitive decomposition of centralized efficiency as the product of coordination
efficiency and decentralized efficiency.
4 Practical implementation
In practice, the true input requirement sets Im(ym) (used for the decentralized measure TEdt )
and I(y) (used for the centralized measure TEct ) are typically not observed. The DEA approach
proceeds by defining empirical approximations of these input sets on the basis of some standard
production axioms. In turn, this defines operational efficiency measures that can be computed
by means of standard linear programming techniques.
4.1 Empirical efficiency measures
In what follows, we use the same production axioms as Cherchye et al (2013):5
Axiom 1 (Nested input sets). ym ≥ ym∗ ⇒ Im(ym) ⊂ Im(ym∗)
Axiom 2 (Monotone input sets). (qm,Q) ∈ Im(ym) and (qm∗,Q∗) ≥ (qm,Q) ⇒ (qm∗,Q∗) ∈
Im(ym)
Axiom 3 (Convex input sets). (qm,Q), (qm∗,Q∗) ∈ Im(ym) ⇒ ∀λ ∈ [0, 1] : λ(qm,Q) + (1 −
λ)(qm∗,Q∗) ∈ Im(ym)
Axiom 4 (Observability means feasibility). (yt, q
1
t , . . . , q
M
t ,Qt) ∈ S ⇒ ∀m : (qmt ,Qt) ∈ Im(ymt ).
In words, Axiom 1 says that, if some input can produce the output ym, then it can also pro-
duce any lower output ym∗. Essentially, this means that outputs are freely disposable. Similarly,
Axiom 2 defines free input disposability, i.e. more input never reduces the output. Next, Axiom
3 states that, if two inputs can produce the output ym, then any convex combination of these
5Of course, other axioms can be used as well. For example, such axioms may impose alternative assump-
tions regarding the nature of returns-to-scale (constant, decreasing or increasing) that underlie the production
technology.
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inputs can also produce the same output. Finally, Axiom 4 says that the observed input-output
combinations are certainly feasible.6
Cherchye et al (2013) have shown that, if Axioms 1-4 hold, an empirical inner bound approx-
imation of the true (but unobserved) set Im(ymt ) is defined as
Iˆ(ymt ) = {(qm,Q)|
∑
s∈Dmt
λms q
m
s ≤ qm,
∑
s∈Dmt
λms Qs ≤ Q,
∑
s∈Dmt
λms = 1, λ
m
s ≥ 0}, (9)
with
Dmt = {s|ymt ≤ yms }. (10)
By construction, we have Iˆm(ymt ) ⊆ Im(ymt ) under Axioms 1-4. The set Iˆ(ymt ) is the smallest
production set that is consistent with Axioms 1-4 for a given data set S and, therefore, it defines
a useful empirical approximation of the true set Im(ymt ).
By combining (4) and (9), we obtain the following empirical approximation of the set Î(y):
Î(y) = {(q,Q) | ∃ q1, . . . ,qM such that
∑
m
qm = q and ∀m : (qm, Q) ∈ Iˆ(ym)}. (11)
Clearly, because Iˆm(ymt ) ⊆ Im(ymt ) we also have that Iˆ(yt) ⊆ I(yt).
Using the empirical approximations Iˆm(ymt ) and Iˆ(yt), we can define the empirical counter-
parts of TEdt and TE
c
t as, respectively,
T̂Edt = min{θ|∀m : (θqmt , θQt) ∈ Iˆm(ymt )}, (12)
and
T̂Ect = min{θ | (θqt, θQt) ∈ Î(yt)}, (13)
which have a readily analogous interpretation as the theoretical measures. Interestingly, the em-
pirical measures T̂Edt and T̂E
c
t can be computed by solving simple linear programming problems,
which we discuss in more detail below.
6Essentially, this assumes that the input and output data are not contaminated by measurement errors.
The DEA literature has forwarded alternative proposals to deal with errors-in-the-data in practical applications.
To compactify our exposition, we will abstract from measurement issues in what follows, but these existing
methodologies are fairly easily integrated in the framework that we set out here. See Cherchye et al (2013) for
related discussion.
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Before doing so, we point out two properties of the measures that are relevant for our following
exposition. Firstly, because Iˆm(ymt ) ⊆ Im(ymt ) and Iˆ(yt) ⊆ I(yt), we naturally obtain
TEdt ≤ T̂Edt and TEct ≤ T̂Ect , (14)
i.e. the empirical efficiency measures define natural upper bounds for the theoretical measures.
Secondly, just as in the theoretical case, the centralized efficiency measure T̂Ect never exceeds
the decentralized measure T̂Edt .
Proposition 2. We have that T̂Ec ≤ T̂Ed.
Analogous to before, the result in Proposition 2 motivates the empirical measure for coordi-
nation efficiency
ĈoEt =
T̂Ect
T̂Edt
, (15)
which has a similar meaning as the theoretical measure CoEt. Again, a low coordination efficiency
reveals that efficiency gains are possible by reallocating the inputs in a more optimal way.
4.2 Linear programming formulation
We conclude this section by discussing the linear programming formulation of T̂Edt and T̂E
d
t .
By using (9) and (11), it is straightforward to verify that
(LP-1) T̂Edt = min
θt≥0,λms ≥0
θt
s.t.
(D-1) ∀m :
∑
s∈Dmt
λms Qs ≤ θtQt
(D-2) ∀m :
∑
s∈Dmt
λms q
m
s ≤ θtqmt
(D-3) ∀m :
∑
s∈Dmt
λms = 1;
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(LP-2) T̂Ect = min
θt≥0,λms ≥0,qm≥0
θt
s.t.
(D-0)
∑
m
qm = θtqt
(D-1) ∀m :
∑
s∈Dmt
λms Qs ≤ θtQt
(D-2)’ ∀m :
∑
s∈Dmt
λms q
m
s ≤ qm
(D-3) ∀m :
∑
s∈Dmt
λms = 1.
Both (LP-1) and (LP-2) compute efficiency measures that quantify the maximum possible
input reduction (captured by θt) for DMU t, while keeping the output fixed. This maximum input
reduction is defined by reference input vectors that are constructed from other observed DMUs.
In particular, for each division m this reference vector corresponds to a convex combination of
all DMUs s that produce at least the output ymt (i.e. s ∈ Dmt ). Each variable λms then represents
the weight of every DMU s in this convex combination. These variables are also called “intensity
parameters” in the DEA literature.
The essential difference between (LP-1) and (LP-2) pertains to the variables qm that appear
in (LP-2). Specifically, in (LP-2) the input quantities qm can be chosen freely (except from the
non-negativity requirement and the adding-up constraint (D-0), i.e.
∑
m q
m = θtqt), whereas in
(LP-1) the division-specific inputs are fixed at their observed level qmt . This additional freedom
to choose the quantities qm in (LP-2) also directly explains the inequality T̂Ec ≤ T̂Ed in
Proposition 2.
Interestingly, the linear programming problem (LP-2) not only defines an empirical measure
of centralized efficiency. It also returns reference values for the division-specific inputs (i.e.
the solution values for qm) that correspond to an optimal input allocation. This is especially
attractive from a practical point of view. For DMUs that have a low coordination efficiency, it
provides specific guidelines on how to improve the input allocation over output divisions.
One final note pertains to the possibility that input reallocations may be restricted in practice.
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For example, it may well be that some inputs are simply not adjustable and/or that changing
the input mix is very expensive. Conveniently, it is fairly easy to adapt our framework to take
such considerations into account. In particular, as long as the associated restrictions can be
formulated in linear form, they can simply be added to (LP-2) without interfering with the
linear nature of the resulting programming problem. For compactness, and because we believe
this type of extension is relatively straightforward, we will not further elaborate on this in the
current paper.
5 Dual representations
An interesting feature of our measures of centralized and decentralized efficiency is that they
can be given a dual representation as measures of cost efficiency, evaluated at shadow input
prices. The difference between the two measures relates to the input prices that are used for
evaluating the division-specific inputs. As we will explain, this difference can be given a precise
interpretation in terms of centralized versus decentralized decision making (i.e. with versus
without input reallocations across output divisions).
5.1 Decentralized efficiency
We first consider our measure of decentralized efficiency. The dual version of the linear program
(LP-1) can be written as7
(LP-3) T̂Edt = max
cmt ≥0,Pmt ∈RNjoin+ ,
Pt∈RNjoin+ ,pmt ∈RNspec+
M∑
m=1
cmt
s.t.
(C-1)
M∑
m=1
Pmt = Pt
(C-2) ∀m : cmt ≤ (pmt )′ qms + (Pmt )′Qs ∀s ∈ Dmt
(C-3)
M∑
m=1
(pmt )
′
qmt +P
′
tQt = 1.
7Appendix A gives specific details on how we obtain the dual problems (LP-3) and (LP-4).
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To explain the cost efficiency interpretation of this dual program, we need to interpret the
vectors Pmt , Pt and p
m
t as shadow price vectors. For every division m, p
m
t and P
m
t contain the
shadow prices for the division-specific and joint inputs, respectively. Similarly, Pt contains the
prices for the joint inputs at the level of the aggregate DMU.
For the joint inputs, the division-specific prices Pmt are related to the DMU-level prices Pt
by the adding-up restriction (C-1). This adding-up restriction implies that the shadow prices
Pmt actually represent the fractions of DMU t’s aggregate prices Pt that are borne by each
divisionm. In a sense, they represent the “willingness-to-pay” (reflecting marginal productivities)
of the different divisions for the jointly (or “publicly”) consumed inputs. This parallels the
interpretation of so-called Lindahl prices that correspond to the efficient provision of public
goods.
Next, the constraint (C-3) defines a cost normalization for the evaluated DMU t. It specifies
that the shadow prices must be such that the aggregate cost of DMU t equals unity.
Given all this,
∑M
m=1 c
m
t can be interpreted as the minimum cost for producing the output
of DMU t. Each variable cmt then represents the minimum cost for producing the output of
DMU t’s division m, while accounting for the interrelation with the output production of the
other divisions (through joint inputs). In particular, restriction (C-2) imposes that cmt cannot
exceed the cost level associated with any other DMU s that produces at least the output ymt
(i.e. s ∈ Dmt ).
In this respect, we also note that, by construction, t ∈ Dmt for any m. Therefore, the
normalization constraint (C-3) guarantees that
M∑
m=1
cmt ≤ 1(=
M∑
m=1
(pmt )
′
qmt +P
′
tQt)), (16)
which implies that the sum of division-specific minimal costs
∑M
m=1 c
m
t is situated between 0
(because of the non-negativity constraints) and 1. Conveniently, because DMU t’s aggregate
cost level is normalized at unity, this also makes that the sum
∑M
m=1 c
m
t in the objective of
problem (LP-3) can be interpreted as the ratio of minimal cost (for the aggregate output yt)
over DMU t’s actual cost. Putting it differently, the objective function value of (LP-3) expresses
DMU t’s cost efficiency in relative terms.
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The max operator in the objective guarantees that the shadow prices pmt , P
m
t and Pt are
chosen such that this measure of cost efficiency is maximized. In a sense, this actually gives the
“benefit-of-the-doubt” to the evaluated DMU. Most favorable prices are chosen, so putting DMU
t in the best possible light.
One important final note is in order. In program (LP-3) the prices pmt for the division-
specific inputs may vary depending on the division m at hand. Intuitively, the fact that different
divisions can use different (shadow) prices for these inputs reflects that these inputs are not
directly substitutable across divisions. This effectively relates to the very essence of our notion
of decentralized efficiency, which assumes that input reallocations across divisions are impossible.
It will also imply a crucial difference with the dual representation of our centralized efficiency
measure.
5.2 Centralized efficiency
We next turn to our centralized efficiency measure. The dual of program (LP-2) is given as
(LP-4) T̂Ect = max
cmt ≥0,Pmt ∈RNjoin+ ,
Pt∈RNjoin+ ,pt∈RNspec+
M∑
m=1
cmt
s.t.
(C-1)
M∑
m=1
Pmt = Pt
(C-2) ∀m : cmt ≤ p′tqms + (Pmt )′Qs ∀s ∈ Dmt
(C-3)
M∑
m=1
p′tq
m
t +P
′
tQt = 1.
This linear programming problem has basically the same structure as problem (LP-3). There-
fore, it also has a directly similar cost efficiency interpretation. However, there is a subtle but
important difference, which pertains to the shadow prices for the division-specific inputs. In the
new problem (LP-4), these prices are the same for all divisions m (i.e. pmt = pt for all m). The
intuition directly relates to our concept of centralized efficiency: in contrast to the decentral-
ized efficiency setting, we now assume that input reallocations over divisions are possible, which
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means that division-specific inputs are perfectly substitutable across divisions (and, thus, we use
common division-specific shadow prices).
A last remark relates to the possibility to impose restrictions on input substitutability across
divisions. As discussed at the end of Section 4, restrictions on input reallocations could be
implemented as linear constraints added to the primal problem (LP-2). In a similar vein,
we could also include additional restrictions to the dual problem (LP-4). It follows from our
above discussion that particular constraints on the (non)substitutability of inputs can here be
implemented in the form of shadow price restrictions. For example, one may want to impose that
some division-specific inputs are perfectly substitutable across divisions (resulting in common
shadow prices for all divisions) while other inputs are not (implying division-specific shadow
prices).
6 Application: US university education and research
We illustrate the practical usefulness of our methodology through an empirical application that
evaluates the efficiency of US universities. In particular, we are interested in the allocation of the
university budget across education and research divisions. We measure inputs as expenditures,
which we subdivide into division-specific and joint expenses. In this application, division-specific
inputs are university expenses that are clearly directed towards either education or research.
Next, joint inputs contain expenditures related to “public” services like libraries, museums,
media, technology and administration. In what follows, we will first motivate our input and
output data in more detail, and subsequently present our main efficiency results.
6.1 Input and output data
When it comes to evaluating university efficiency, the definition of the relevant input and output
dimensions is all but straightforward. There is a lack of consensus in the literature on the most
appropriate selection of inputs and outputs. To focus our discussion, and given that our objective
here is mainly to illustrate the practical application of our methodology, we opt for a fairly basic
specification of a university’s production process.
We are interested in the joint production of education and research conducted by universities,
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and we will particularly concentrate on the allocation of the university budget across the edu-
cation and research divisions. In this respect, our study here is close in spirit to Beasley (1995),
who analyzed the teaching and research efficiency of chemistry and physics departments in the
UK. This author also takes into account that some resources are shared between the different
activities. However, an important difference is that Beasley (1995) considered the shared input
as a division-specific input of which the allocation over research and teaching is unknown. By
contrast, our specific methodology allows us to treat shared inputs as joint inputs that simulta-
neously benefit the production of both teaching and research.
We use data on 130 US universities in 2012. Our sample contains both (87) public and
(43) private non-profit institutions. We retrieved the main part of our data from the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The NCES collects and analyzes detailed information
on education in the United States. In order to obtain a sample that is sufficiently comparable
(i.e. homogeneous), we (only) selected universities that are classified as research universities,
with high or very high research activity (according to the Carnegie classification). Moreover, our
selected universities all appeared in the top 500 of the Shanghai ranking in the year 2012.8
Output selection. We consider two outputs for the education division and two outputs for the
research division of each university. The two education outputs are undergraduate and graduate
enrollments, expressed in full time equivalents. The advantage of considering enrollments (and
not degrees granted) is that this measure also takes into account students who have not yet
completed their studies but did receive education from the university. Our enrollment data come
from the NCES and pertain to the academic year 2011-2012.
The two research outputs are number of doctor’s degrees and a measure of publication output.
Again, number of doctor’s degrees is taken from the NCES and relates to the year 2012. Next,
our measure of publication output is constructed such that it not only accounts for the quantity
but also the quality of scientific publications, where quality is measured in terms of researchers’
citations. Specifically, we quantify publication output as the mean of 3 scores (standardized
between 0 and 100) that are also used for the Shanghai ranking: HiCi (i.e. highly cited researchers
in 21 broad subject categories), N&S (i.e. papers published in Nature and Science) and PUB
8The Shanghai ranking is a widely used world ranking of universities that simultaneously accounts for several
indicators of research performance. See www.shanghairanking.com for more details.
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(i.e. papers indexed in Science Citation Index-expanded and Social Science Citation Index).
Input selection. We use university expenses as inputs. The public universities report expenses
according to GASB (Governmental Accounting Standards Board), while the private universities
report according to FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board).9 We distinguish between
expenses that can be allocated directly to the research and eduction divisions and expenses that
have a joint (or “public”) nature.
Our division-specific inputs can be retrieved directly from the NCES data. Specifically, we
use as education input all expenses that relate to activities that form part of the instruction
program. Similarly, our research input contains all expenses related to activities specifically
organized to produce research outcomes.
Next, our joint input contains expenses on institutional and academic support, which are
vital to the proper “overall” functioning of a university (including both education and research).
Institutional support includes, for example, the management, personnel administration and lo-
gistic activities. Academic support contains academic administration, libraries, museums and
computer services.
We remark that our following analysis will not consider expenses on public services (e.g.
community service programs, radio, television and consulting) or student services (e.g. student
activities, newspapers, health services and athletics). Our motivation is that we believe these
expenses are not directly related to the education and research outputs that we selected. However,
it should be clear that these data could easily be included in the analysis if deemed appropriate.
Our choice not to use this information is purely an empirical one and does by no means indicate
a limitation of our methodology.
Data. Appendix C contains our input and output data for each individual university, while
Table 1 reports some summary statistics. Expenses are reported in millions of dollars. We find
substantial variation across our sample of universities for each of the variables that we selected.
9Our analysis implicitly assumes that GASB and FASB are comparable accounting standards. In this respect,
we also conducted several robustness checks to ensure that our conclusions with respect to public and private
universities cannot be attributed to differences in these accounting standards. In particular, we computed efficiency
results with numbers of staff (instead of expenses) as inputs. Interestingly, these alternative exercises yielded the
same qualitative conclusions.
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See, for example, the high standard deviations and the large differences between minimum and
maximum values.
The last two columns of Table 1 report the mean values for the public and private univer-
sities. A main difference between these two categories of universities relates to the number of
undergraduate enrollments. On average, public universities have 22551 undergraduate enroll-
ments, which is more than twice the average of 9177 enrollments for the private universities.
In this respect, a remarkable observation is that average expenses on instruction for the public
universities are nearly one third below those for their private counterparts.
On the basis of these figures, public universities seem to be more efficient than private uni-
versities in the provision of (undergraduate) education. However, an important remark is that
student enrollments only measure the quantity but not the quality of this education output. For
example, it may well be that private universities specialize in “excellent” education, while public
universities rather focus on “standard” education. Unfortunately, we could not find data on the
educational quality for our sample of universities, and so we are bound to ignore such quality
considerations in our following efficiency analysis. While we will not repeat it explicitly, this
qualification must be kept in mind when interpreting our efficiency results.
Variables Full sample Public Private
Mean Std Min Max Mean Mean
Instruction and research expenses 766 560 142 2774 690 921
→ Instruction 458 343 88 1947 399 579
→ Research 308 259 4 1291 291 342
Academic and institutional expenses 242 186 50 1434 205 318
Undergraduate enrollment 18127 10065 968 55016 22551 9177
Graduate enrollment 5318 3189 757 16373 5271 5413
Doctor’s degree 329 213 35 892 350 284
Publication 30 16 11 100 28 35
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the sample of 130 US universities, including 87 public and 43
private universities. Expenses are reported in millions of dollars.
6.2 Efficiency results
We will first report summary statistics for our measures of decentralized, centralized and coor-
dination efficiency, defined over our sample of 130 universities. Subsequently, we will consider
efficiency differences between public and private universities. In a final step, we will take a closer
19
look at the allocation of university budgets across education and research. In particular, starting
from the observation that our sample is characterized by substantial coordination inefficiency,
we use the results of our linear programs to identify possible strategies that can lead universities
towards a more optimal input allocation.
Full sample results. Table 2 provides summary results for our different efficiency measures.
Detailed information on the efficiency results of each university can be found in Appendix C.
If we first consider centralized efficiency for the full sample of universities, we find that about
40% of the universities is labeled as efficient. The average centralized efficiency amounts to 0.86,
which suggests that the average university can reduce its expenses by 14% for the given levels of
education and research outputs.
As indicated above, centralized efficiency can be decomposed into decentralized efficiency
and coordination efficiency. We find that the average decentralized efficiency equals 0.92. This
indicates that the possible input reduction amounts to only 8% if input reallocations over research
and education are impossible.
The difference between centralized and decentralized efficiency is captured by our measure of
coordination efficiency. The average coordination efficiency turns out to be 0.93, which reveals
that optimal input reallocations can yield an additional efficiency gain of 7%. Interestingly,
because the median coordination efficiency value is 0.98 (i.e. below unity), we conclude that
such input reallocations can be beneficial to more than half of the universities in our sample.
Min. 1st Qu. Mean Median 3rd Qu. Max.
Centralized Eff. 0.40 0.76 0.86 0.92 1.00 1.00
→ public 0.45 0.80 0.89 0.97 1.00 1.00
→ private 0.40 0.66 0.80 0.85 0.99 1.00
Decentralized Eff. 0.50 0.88 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00
→ public 0.57 0.90 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00
→ private 0.50 0.75 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00
Coordination Eff. 0.62 0.90 0.93 0.98 1.00 1.00
→ public 0.64 0.91 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00
→ private 0.62 0.84 0.91 0.94 1.00 1.00
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for our efficiency results
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Public versus private universities. When distinguishing between the public and private
universities, we observe that the public universities operate on average more efficient than their
private counterparts. This difference is more pronounced for our measures of decentralized and
centralized efficiency than for our measure of coordination efficiency. This suggests that the
better performance of public universities is not so much the result of a better input allocation
per se (i.e. coordination efficiency), but rather follows from a more efficient input use for the
given allocation of expenses over education and research (i.e. decentralized efficiency).
We also conducted Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to evaluate the statistical significance of these
observed efficiency differences. We find that the difference is significant for the centralized effi-
ciency measure (the null hypothesis that both subsamples achieve the same efficiency level has a
p-value of only 0.004) and the decentralized efficiency measure (p-value of 0.024). By contrast,
there is no significant difference in terms of coordination efficiency (p-value of 0.109).
Generally, we may conclude that we find a rather substantial difference in centralized efficiency
between private and public universities, and decentralized efficiency seems to be a more important
explanation of this difference than coordination efficiency. Interestingly, our outcome that public
universities perform better than private universities conforms with earlier findings of Ahn et al
(1988), who compared the relative efficiencies of public and private doctoral-granting universities
in the US. These authors equally concluded that public universities prove to be more efficient
than private universities when managerial and program inefficiencies are present in the data.
Reallocation strategies. Our above analysis indicates that only 49 of the 130 universities
achieve a centralized efficiency score of one. The remaining 81 universities have a score below
one, which means that efficiency improvements are possible. When zooming in on these 81
universities, we find that 73 of them exhibit coordination inefficiency. For these universities,
reallocating the division-specific inputs over the education and research divisions effectively leads
to efficiency gains.
In this respect, we recall that a centralized efficiency score of θ indicates that all expenses (i.e.
joint expenses as well as division-specific expenses) can be reduced by a fraction (1−θ). However,
and importantly, these savings need not be equally distributed across the education and research
divisions. It is even possible that one of the divisions receives additional (division-specific) budget
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Figure 1: Possible strategies to achieve an optimal allocation of the budget.
as a consequence of the reallocation, at the expense of the other division.
As explained above (when discussing (LP-2)), our linear programs not only define an empir-
ical measure of centralized efficiency, but also provide specific guidelines on how to enhance the
input allocation over output divisions. Specifically, it returns reference values for the division-
specific inputs that correspond to an optimal input allocation. Interestingly, this information
enables us to conclude whether a division needs to reduce or increase the current (division-
specific) input, in order to remedy the observed coordination inefficiency.
In Appendix C, we report for each university the changes in the budget directed towards edu-
cation or research that are necessary to eliminate its coordination inefficiency. Figure 1 provides
a schematic summary of the different strategies that can be followed, hereby also indicating to
how many universities each strategy applies.
In the first scenario, both divisions need to reduce their inputs, but not in equal proportion.
In percentage terms, one of the divisions needs to save considerably more than the other division.
This scenario holds for 38 universities. For 20 universities, the education division needs to reduce
the division-specific input more than the research division. For the remaining 18 universities,
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the opposite conclusion holds.
In the second scenario, which holds for 35 universities, one of the divisions receives additional
division-specific input. Of course, in such a case the required input reduction for the other
division is particularly substantial, since the input use at the aggregate DMU level (summed
over the two divisions) needs to go down. For this scenario, we find that the research division
should receive extra budget (at the expense of the education division) in 26 of the 35 universities,
while the opposite conclusion applies to the other 9 universities.
7 Conclusion
We have extended the DEA-based methodology of Cherchye et al (2013) for multi-output effi-
ciency measurement. Our extension exploits the specific feature of this methodology, which in-
cludes information on joint and division-specific inputs in the efficiency evaluation. In particular,
we use this input information to develop a method that investigates whether input reallocations
across output divisions can yield specific efficiency gains. We propose a measure of coordination
efficiency to quantify these gains. Interestingly, for DMUs with low coordination efficiency our
method also provides concrete guidelines to achieve a more optimal input allocation.
We have used our methodology to evaluate the productive efficiency of education and research
conducted at US universities. We believe our methodology is particularly well-suited to analyze
the joint production of education and research, as it can account for both joint inputs and inputs
specifically allocated to education or research. Although our application was mainly intended to
serve illustrative purposes, it did clearly reveal the potential of our new method. For example,
our empirical results suggest that the universities under study can considerably enhance their
productive efficiency by adopting a more optimal input allocation (over education and research
outputs). In particular, we found that more than half of the universities suffer from coordination
inefficiency.
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A Dual formulations
In this section, we clarify the link between the primal and dual formulation of the LP-models. In
the decentralized setting, the linear programming problem (LP-3) is dual to problem (LP-1).
Similarly, in the centralized setting, problem (LP-4) is dual to problem (LP-2).
We start by considering the decentralized setting. The constraint (D-1) in (LP-1), which
constructs for every division m a reference vector for the joint inputs, corresponds to the shadow
price vector Pmt in the dual cost efficiency problem. Similarly, the constraint (D-2), which
constructs a benchmark vector for the division-specific inputs, corresponds to the shadow price
vector pmt . Further, the constraint (D-3) corresponds to the (minimal) costs variable c
m
t for
every division m.
Next, we focus on the centralized setting. The only difference between (LP-3) and (LP-4)
is that (LP-4) uses the common price vector pt for the division-specific inputs. To see that
(LP-4) is dual to the linear programming problem (LP-2), we first write the problem (LP-2)
in a slightly different form. For this, we use lemma 1:
Lemma 1. The statement
∃ q1, . . . , qM such that
∑
m
qm = θtqt and ∀m :
∑
s∈Dmt
λms q
m
s ≤ qm (17)
is equivalent to the statement ∑
m
∑
s∈Dmt
λms q
m
s ≤ θtqt. (18)
As a consequence, the linear programming problem (LP-2) is equivalent to the following
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problem (LP-2b):
(LP-2b) T̂Ect = min
θt≥0,λms ≥0
θt
s.t.
(D-1) ∀m :
∑
s∈Dmt
λms Qs ≤ θtQt
(D-2)”
∑
m
∑
s∈Dmt
λms q
m
s ≤ θtqt
(D-3) ∀m :
∑
s∈Dmt
λms = 1
Note that this linear programming problem (LP-2b) is very similar to (LP-1). The only
difference is that left hand side of constraint (D-2)” contains a sum over all divisions m (whereas
the constraint (D-2) specifies a separate constraint for every individual m). The constraint (D-
2)” corresponds to the shadow price vector pt in the dual problem. We conclude that problem
(LP-4) is dual to problem (LP-2b) and, thus, also to the equivalent problem (LP-2).
B Proofs
Proposition 1. For qt =
∑
m q
m
t we have
{θ | ∀m : (θqmt , θQt) ∈ Im(ymt )} ⊂
 θ ∃ q
1, . . . ,qM such that
∑
m q
m = qt
and ∀m : (θqm, θQt) ∈ Im(ymt )

= {θ | (θqt, θQt) ∈ I(yt)}
Consequently,
min{θ | (θqt, θQt) ∈ I(yt)} ≤ min{θ | ∀m : (θqmt , θQt) ∈ Im(ymt )},
which obtains that TEc ≤ TEd.
Proposition 2. We will prove that constraint (D-2) implies the constraints (D-0) and (D-2)’.
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Suppose that (D-2) holds. Define qm = θtq
m
t . We have found values for q
1, . . . ,qM such that
(D-0) and (D-2)’ hold. We conclude that the feasible region of (LP-1) is a subset of the feasible
region of (LP-2). Since (LP-1) and (LP-2) are both minimization problems, the optimal
objective function value for (LP-2) cannot exceed the optimal value for (LP-1). We conclude
that T̂Ec ≤ T̂Ed.
Lemma 1. It is straightforward that (17) implies (18). Furthermore, suppose that (18) holds.
Define
qm =
∑
s∈Dmt
λms q
m
s ,
for m = 1, . . . ,M − 1, and
qM = θtqt −
M−1∑
m=1
qm.
Then, by construction
∑
m q
m
t = θtqt and
∑
s∈Dmt λ
m
s q
m
s ≤ qm, which implies that statement
(17) is satisfied.
C Data and results
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Universities Inputs Outputs Efficiency scores Reallocation
Expenses ( $ million) Enrollment (FTE) Research of budget for
Instr Res A&I Undergr Grad Doc Pub TEd TEc CoE Instr Res
Arizona State University 637 243 369 55016 10479 611 33,1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Auburn University 264 131 121 19777 3137 247 14 0,92 0,78 0,85 0,71 0,93
Boston College 243 37 171 9525 3573 149 14,6 1,00 0,76 0,76 0,64 1,58
Boston University 838 194 264 20951 8692 507 35,9 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Brandeis University 133 47 51 3970 2644 82 15,3 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Brigham Young University-Provo 424 43 145 31364 2775 92 15,5 1,00 0,87 0,87 0,78 1,72
Brown University 254 124 180 6109 1864 232 34,5 1,00 0,76 0,76 0,46 1,38
California Institute of Technology 203 281 118 968 1286 172 56,1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Carnegie Mellon University 337 221 199 5834 5048 284 27,5 0,75 0,62 0,83 0,46 0,86
Case Western Reserve University 270 395 113 4177 2469 186 26,6 0,82 0,82 1,00 0,72 0,89
Clemson University 211 144 76 16035 3297 220 16,5 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Colorado State University-Fort Collins 241 218 103 21891 4014 235 26,2 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Columbia University in the City of New York 1947 671 357 8163 14946 558 58,8 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Cornell University 471 378 474 14887 5463 501 52,5 1,00 0,90 0,90 0,59 1,28
Dartmouth College 153 161 321 4237 1630 73 23,1 0,76 0,66 0,86 0,76 0,55
Drexel University 299 119 313 16433 5388 163 15,2 0,92 0,85 0,92 0,92 0,67
Duke University 901 899 464 8109 6159 450 50,4 0,74 0,62 0,83 0,31 0,93
Emory University 532 409 271 8495 5699 243 35,4 0,53 0,51 0,97 0,53 0,49
Florida State University 330 160 126 31800 6824 428 24,1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
George Mason University 303 80 115 19594 6547 212 16 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
George Washington University 398 140 269 10206 8356 224 18,9 1,00 0,97 0,97 1,04 0,80
Georgetown University 416 172 288 7440 4911 116 17,1 0,50 0,41 0,82 0,37 0,50
Georgia Institute of Technology-Main Campus 282 658 137 14517 7076 483 29,8 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Harvard University 1064 769 1434 9515 13315 691 100 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Indiana University-Bloomington 530 113 205 32420 8514 468 29,1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Indiana University-Purdue University-Indianapolis 399 180 229 18794 8311 35 15,9 1,00 0,91 0,91 1,31 0,02
Iowa State University 257 195 191 24128 3203 376 27,5 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Johns Hopkins University 1520 1254 438 6452 13979 479 53,9 0,92 0,85 0,93 1,14 0,50
Kansas State University 211 156 92 17593 2569 162 17,1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Kent State University at Kent 180 23 106 20660 4709 142 15,2 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Lehigh University 130 34 87 5239 1227 101 14,1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Louisiana State University 274 275 150 23195 4094 322 23,1 0,83 0,83 1,00 0,83 0,83
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 643 1291 618 4364 6398 573 66,4 0,58 0,58 1,00 0,58 0,58
Michigan State University 620 380 232 35003 5912 491 34,9 0,95 0,95 1,00 0,95 0,94
Montana State University 88 127 50 11314 1039 53 13,1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
New York University 1202 644 417 24402 16373 417 46,3 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
North Carolina State University at Raleigh 386 267 162 24394 5993 446 27,3 1,00 0,97 0,97 0,78 1,26
Northeastern University 327 91 196 17934 6653 125 16,7 0,94 0,89 0,94 0,88 0,94
Northwestern University 631 426 476 9017 8331 378 48,2 0,97 0,86 0,90 0,63 1,21
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Universities Inputs Outputs Efficiency scores Reallocation
Expenses ( $ million) Enrollment (FTE) Research of budget for
Instr Res A&I Undergr Grad Doc Pub TEd TEc CoE Instr Res
Ohio State University-Main Campus 922 490 402 45479 10545 756 41,8 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Oregon State University 219 197 119 19003 3138 197 26,7 0,84 0,78 0,93 0,93 0,62
Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus 1170 766 618 41350 5612 629 45,5 0,82 0,52 0,64 0,24 0,96
Princeton University 381 273 312 5240 2839 351 50,4 1,00 0,94 0,94 0,41 1,69
Purdue University-Main Campus 620 268 231 31592 7276 649 35,1 1,00 0,97 0,97 0,85 1,23
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 142 117 83 5622 1165 136 17,7 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Rice University 251 89 90 3774 2614 190 25,3 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Rutgers University-New Brunswick 824 342 280 32676 6246 414 36 1,00 0,87 0,87 0,72 1,25
Saint Louis University-Main Campus 235 44 107 9175 2442 205 12,9 1,00 0,87 0,87 0,66 2,01
San Diego State University 190 4 92 23874 3294 48 18 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Southern Methodist University 153 22 142 6333 2759 67 10,7 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Stanford University 1200 1023 549 7485 6749 764 76,8 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Stony Brook University 426 123 225 16544 5515 263 25,9 0,92 0,72 0,78 0,65 0,94
SUNY at Albany 198 231 141 12475 2900 158 16,6 0,81 0,64 0,79 0,95 0,37
Syracuse University 312 73 197 16429 3776 150 15,9 1,00 0,67 0,67 0,58 1,08
Temple University 420 110 264 26598 3828 216 17,2 1,00 0,74 0,74 0,66 1,03
Texas A & M University-College Station 591 538 200 36801 7613 663 36,5 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Texas Tech University 202 137 125 23897 4232 254 14,9 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
The University of Montana 97 45 58 11645 1196 44 14,9 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
The University of Tennessee 554 289 252 19668 5289 461 24,7 0,70 0,64 0,91 0,51 0,89
The University of Texas at Austin 772 549 358 35361 9049 867 45,4 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
The University of Texas at Dallas 155 86 82 10549 5487 181 17,1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
The University of Texas at San Antonio 160 51 109 22898 3008 77 12,9 1,00 0,94 0,94 1,08 0,49
Tufts University 212 137 288 4728 4442 143 24,5 0,73 0,70 0,95 0,73 0,65
Tulane University of Louisiana 258 157 104 8257 2642 120 17,8 0,84 0,84 1,00 0,83 0,85
University at Buffalo 390 146 244 20380 4730 305 20,5 0,80 0,74 0,91 0,69 0,86
University of Alabama at Birmingham 273 268 279 9915 4661 174 25 0,57 0,45 0,79 0,57 0,33
University of Alaska Fairbanks 104 145 69 5749 757 50 15,7 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Arizona 430 467 297 29451 5319 446 38,3 0,92 0,84 0,92 0,73 0,94
University of Arkansas 184 125 106 18154 2704 164 14,9 0,95 0,88 0,93 1,02 0,67
University of California-Berkeley 647 629 359 27737 9680 892 68,6 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of California-Davis 652 614 378 25315 4955 566 47,2 1,00 0,81 0,81 0,38 1,27
University of California-Irvine 507 317 261 23472 5013 413 37,6 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,68 1,40
University of California-Los Angeles 1451 833 670 27911 10929 725 60,5 0,76 0,54 0,71 0,41 0,76
University of California-Riverside 212 121 93 18182 2463 263 29,3 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of California-San Diego 631 829 459 24272 5306 523 59 0,78 0,78 1,00 0,78 0,78
University of California-Santa Barbara 235 203 108 19439 3392 346 38,4 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of California-Santa Cruz 144 132 87 16220 1607 172 31,4 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Central Florida 276 115 164 45446 5852 229 19,1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
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Expenses ( $ million) Enrollment (FTE) Research of budget for
Instr Res A&I Undergr Grad Doc Pub TEd TEc CoE Instr Res
University of Chicago 990 319 322 4988 7035 401 47,3 1,00 0,83 0,83 0,29 2,52
University of Cincinnati-Main Campus 304 209 223 20875 7592 242 23,5 0,94 0,78 0,83 0,94 0,55
University of Colorado Boulder 378 321 145 25523 3423 344 41,2 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Colorado Denver 408 291 97 9746 5364 107 21,6 0,90 0,90 1,00 0,90 0,90
University of Connecticut 477 163 337 17998 4379 313 20,1 0,69 0,49 0,71 0,38 0,82
University of Delaware 346 135 141 18067 3510 228 22 0,88 0,74 0,84 0,68 0,89
University of Florida 708 609 288 32257 11226 696 39,3 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Georgia 286 352 173 25346 7599 453 29,7 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Hawaii at Manoa 295 350 92 13443 2811 196 29,5 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Houston 248 115 220 26555 5017 301 22,7 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,98
University of Illinois at Chicago 664 296 173 16024 7758 342 28,7 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 589 489 323 34331 12847 869 45,4 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Iowa 389 338 235 22609 3471 437 32,6 0,96 0,89 0,94 0,52 1,32
University of Kansas 375 298 174 18874 4787 302 20,8 0,78 0,70 0,90 0,80 0,57
University of Kentucky 291 293 210 19363 3397 322 19,5 0,62 0,59 0,95 0,62 0,56
University of Louisville 272 161 135 13668 2847 185 13,3 0,68 0,66 0,96 0,70 0,58
University of Maryland-College Park 448 434 250 26510 6480 632 41,7 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Massachusetts Amherst 349 133 138 22330 4849 268 28,4 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,91 1,09
University of Miami 459 233 278 10556 2645 181 28,4 0,51 0,40 0,80 0,35 0,51
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 956 817 508 27287 13466 857 60,4 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 668 739 609 30115 5621 734 49,9 0,85 0,64 0,76 0,41 0,85
University of Missouri-Columbia 319 161 137 24251 4532 367 20,1 0,98 0,98 1,00 0,99 0,97
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 206 197 118 17878 3216 246 21,9 0,88 0,79 0,89 0,96 0,62
University of New Hampshire-Main Campus 155 147 71 13351 1690 58 16,2 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of New Mexico-Main Campus 260 191 107 19167 3796 202 21,8 0,97 0,97 1,00 0,97 0,97
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 723 505 254 18078 6143 495 43,2 1,00 0,99 0,99 0,40 1,84
University of Notre Dame 332 116 240 9212 2828 210 21,1 0,98 0,61 0,62 0,47 1,01
University of Oklahoma Norman Campus 275 115 142 18367 3843 218 16 1,00 0,77 0,77 0,66 1,04
University of Oregon 261 90 121 20118 3323 170 18,7 0,99 0,87 0,88 0,82 0,99
University of Pennsylvania 1085 704 944 11871 10413 514 58,4 0,89 0,68 0,76 0,54 0,89
University of Pittsburgh-Pittsburgh Campus 466 690 323 18426 8473 479 42,2 1,00 0,85 0,85 1,06 0,71
University of Rhode Island 117 99 97 13280 1929 89 16,6 1,00 0,98 0,98 1,08 0,86
University of Rochester 314 316 157 6461 3473 265 30,6 0,69 0,69 1,00 0,69 0,69
University of South Carolina-Columbia 295 133 133 22619 4784 279 20,8 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of South Florida-Main Campus 310 278 169 28780 7104 270 21,1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Southern California 1436 392 460 18849 12851 634 38,3 1,00 0,91 0,91 0,84 1,15
University of Utah 342 285 183 21657 6114 339 34,3 0,87 0,81 0,93 0,90 0,70
University of Vermont 190 101 116 10987 861 62 15,6 0,83 0,68 0,83 0,46 1,10
University of Virginia-Main Campus 376 345 230 15513 6915 393 36 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,76 1,17
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Universities Inputs Outputs Efficiency scores Reallocation
Expenses ( $ million) Enrollment (FTE) Research of budget for
Instr Res A&I Undergr Grad Doc Pub TEd TEc CoE Instr Res
University of Washington-Seattle Campus 1053 890 516 29247 12081 708 59,2 0,71 0,70 0,99 0,63 0,77
University of Wisconsin-Madison 512 931 252 27872 6270 813 52 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
University of Wyoming 165 90 83 9300 1462 72 14,6 0,90 0,85 0,94 0,94 0,69
Utah State University 167 134 87 20080 2015 94 13,7 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Vanderbilt University 843 439 191 6814 3880 273 35,1 0,57 0,57 1,00 0,57 0,57
Virginia Commonwealth University 338 148 137 21703 5080 333 21 1,00 0,97 0,97 0,94 1,03
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 306 330 138 24847 5887 469 25,1 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
Wake Forest University 184 171 619 4639 1625 57 17,4 0,63 0,58 0,91 0,63 0,52
Washington State University 234 226 151 21399 4487 203 21 1,00 0,89 0,89 1,24 0,52
Washington University in St Louis 1254 495 269 6934 3565 251 44,9 1,00 0,94 0,94 0,45 2,17
Wayne State University 316 187 167 15873 4821 229 19,2 0,90 0,81 0,91 0,92 0,63
Yale University 1288 506 513 6863 6370 390 60 1,00 0,70 0,70 0,45 1,35
Yeshiva University 221 257 159 2593 1463 129 21,1 0,55 0,55 1,00 0,55 0,55
Table 3: Data on US universities in 2012
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